---
name: debt-rh
description: Screen of DEBT (inyourdebt.fun) on Robinhood Chain, 31 Aug 2026. The first RH-chain payout token whose full waterfall was verified transaction by transaction, and the case that exposed the price-driver rubric's missing off-chain-key factor. Read before re-screening DEBT or any "autonomous obligor / auto-coupon" token.
sources: [cowork]
aliases: [debt-token, inyourdebt, the-obligor]
---

# DEBT, Robinhood Chain, screened 31 Aug 2026 16:00 UTC

- [stated] Ben pasted the DexScreener pair and asked for a review, then asked for the new valuation drivers system to be used, then sent the whitepaper and /ledger pages himself.

## Addresses
- Token 0x5407B93692B5FCD2BBf5F8CfB328fAE68006F786, PonsV2LauncherToken, verified, no owner, no mint, 100% float
- Main pair (Uniswap v4, ETH) 0xe2d0174d9bc0edfb755659009373139dbc8b72c8062f087ada984523628a6d12
- Obligor EOA 0xc7926ca2Ba6aF6FcdF3a627687a9363885c9048F, funded 0.0507 ETH by 0xca7ded7e4F4Ba8aB3B10009236Ae6d1b95094589 at 06:27 UTC (degree test NOT run, unresolved)
- Coupon disperser 0x2bF9b7a12EBfbA9bd370943fa68A7c3ccd43b306, unverified source, created by the obligor
- Swap router used for the sinking fund 0x65050A9b7E5075A2bA5cED7b1b64EE66262c40Dc (TransparentUpgradeableProxy)
- Pons V2 fee escrow 0xd3AFEB2a57f70eF218Aa82451c51B2fb0416Ac9e (V2FeeEscrow), bonding curve 0x21E2c8442DD6A08D16959009AE18c2B1823c4e82
- Engine https://debt-engine.fly.dev/stats and /config (only live routes; /filings, /ledger, /history all 404)

## What was verified, transaction by transaction
- Pro-rata ETH coupons ARE real: one 20-second batch paid 50 distinct EOAs 0.0000203 to 0.0000247 ETH each through the disperser. This is the first RH-chain payout token where the payout was confirmed at recipient level rather than from a claim.
- Sinking fund IS a real open-market buy and a real burn: per period, ETH to the router, DEBT in from PoolManager 0x8366a39CC670B4001A1121B8F6A443A643e40951, then burn selector 0x42966c68 to 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000.
- Waterfall 60/30/10 confirmed arithmetically on the 15:33 UTC period: 0.004060 ETH coupons against 0.002063 ETH sink.
- Priced: lifetime revenue 0.5377 ETH ($1,330), coupons 0.3226 ETH ($798), sinking fund $399 for 7,625,861 notes (0.763% of supply). Effective take rate 0.1454% of its own 24h volume.

## Claims that are FALSE and matter
1. "Amendment: None, by any party, under any circumstance" is false. No contract enforces the waterfall. It is a process on fly.io holding one private key. The whole covenant is a promise, not code.
2. "The machine keeps nothing / retained 0" is false as stated: the obligor held 0.5389 ETH against a stated reserve of 0.0564 ETH, and 4 DEBT against a whitepaper clause saying it holds no notes.
3. Whitepaper Table 1 and Definition 2.2 say "SPL token" and "SPL burn". app.js purges a cached "base58 Solana mint from a retired test issuance". This is a Solana project relaunched on RH chain with the documents unrewritten. The operator has already abandoned one issuance.
4. Front page still read "STATUS: PRE-ISSUANCE, Contract: to be published" eight hours after launch while /ledger and the engine were live.
5. Phishing live at screen time: @nftfuryw "wallet check live" with the correct CA.

## Numbers at screen
mcap $254,260 falling from $315k ATH set 08:40 UTC (-19%), age 7.6h, liquidity $46,609, quote side 9.43 ETH = $23,314, vol24 $914,762, turnover 3.6x, holders 683, EOA top-10 16.58%, V2LaunchLocker 8.23%, PoolManager 8.44%.

## THE RUBRIC GAP THIS SCREEN EXPOSED
Float-Versus-Flow scored DEBT 80/100 (Full): supply 33/40 (zero unlocks, zero emissions, 100% float), demand 20/35, rerating room 22/25, +5 reflexivity. All three gates passed. **The score is wrong, for the same reason the DeFi Summer test flagged with YAM: the rubric has no factor for a mechanism that lives off chain.** DEBT's entire value accrual is one private key away from ending, and nothing in the 100 points can see that. Verdict was overridden to Probe.
PROPOSED FIX, not yet accepted by Ben: add an ENFORCEMENT factor to the DEMAND block, scoring where the routing rule actually lives (immutable contract / upgradeable contract / off-chain key), because B2 currently pays 12 points for a routing percentage without asking who can change it.
Second conflict: the frozen v3 micro-cap gate REJECTS DEBT on both drawdown (-19%, needs worse than -50%) and turnover (3.6x, needs under 0.5). Turnover is consistently negative for forward returns across 5/5 origins. That is the strongest tested negative in the screen and it points the opposite way to the rubric.

## Structural finding worth carrying forward
DEBT is #1 on the chain on percentage of revenue routed to the token (90%, against PONS 24% and INJOH 40%), and simultaneously has ZERO exposure to chain growth, because its fee base is its own trading volume. The chain 5x / 10x scenario table is degenerate for a token whose toll booth is on itself. **Standing note: for a self-referential payout token, run the volume-decay table instead of the chain-growth table.**

## Verdict delivered
PROBE. Real mechanism, smallest cap on the chain with a working verified payout, but the covenant is off-chain and 100% of the economics rest on eight hours of launch-day churn.
Falsifiers given: (1) coupon run-rate holding above roughly $300/day past 3 Sep, (2) the waterfall percentages or the payer address changing, (3) the front page never publishing the CA.

## OUTCOME, rechecked 2 Sep 2026 02:34 UTC, 43 hours after launch. THE PROBE VERDICT WAS WRONG.
- mcap **$13,091**, off ATH **-95.9%**, liquidity $10,429, vol24 $23,671, 0 buys in the last 5 minutes, holders 683 -> 452. Dead by the lowcap-screen rule.
- Engine still "live": 519 periods elapsed, only 125 paid. couponsPaid 0.3226 -> 0.3499 ETH, i.e. **$66 of coupons in 34 hours**. Falsifier 1 failed within a day.
- **THE SWEEP HAPPENED, 5 hours after the screen.** Obligor sent 0.4 ETH to `0xaf924bbC01686d0E89e00CB69C079dAA8A3c595c` (31 Aug 21:02, an EOA holding 12.43 ETH that snipes launches in 0.101 ETH slugs through `0x4A86009A36FceC5Aa341ffCEB3205a911FcF6f60`) and 0.3977 + 0.0065 ETH to `0x9e48C2143B21c80eF905a7F46c7cF3b60B48cc0f` (22:07). **~0.80 ETH swept, more than every coupon ever paid combined.** Obligor balance now 0.0093 ETH.
- **The "autonomous obligor that does not answer correspondence" launched four new tokens from the same key on PonsV2LaunchFactory `0x7eD598BcEf8bd9Edd8C97A195C6d13f40801EC7e`:** rob `0x1166C139C86BcEc77B4E37941dCd1df04C9401AC` (31 Aug 22:00), ROBBIE `0x565801ff331505c67922e32b8F203fb558E329f1` and `0x9317977bC68B01B52df5A90ae3A397E8840A6419` (1 Sep 05:21), rob `0x96fa1698c4D17b24aF40835fec5fE60f7AEEe9f9` (05:23), with transferCreatorFeeRecipient calls. It is a token farm.
- The 60/30 split held on every large period and wobbled on dust periods (odd-lot carry), so it was never formally changed. It did not need to be. The operator simply took the balance.

## WHAT I GOT WRONG, for the standing lessons
1. **I overrode two of Ben's tested instruments with a verified mechanism.** The frozen v3 gate rejected DEBT on turnover 3.6x and drawdown -19%; I called it "the strongest tested negative" and gave Probe anyway. The 50k+ kill check also fired and I missed it: @btcoinmag (274,280 followers) posted the CA at 12:33 and @RobinhoodAlphas (53,126) posted "$debt could be next 100x" at 07:22. I wrote "all real coverage is sub 50k" and "largest genuine caller 2,312 followers"; the largest was @0xalixbtno at 4,036 and the two 50k+ accounts were real posts, not DM-bots. **A working payout does not outrank the survival model. Lesson: when the mechanism is verified but the operator holds the key, the verified mechanism is worth nothing and the screen should be scored as if it were unverified.**
2. Frame 1 called the -97% decay row "the harsh case" and put the anchor above spot. Reality hit that row inside 24 hours. A day-one payout token's Frame 1 should use the -97% row as the BASE case, not the harsh one.
3. Arithmetic slip: an age line used a wrong epoch constant (138h). Real age at recheck 43h.
4. The tier-one X query matched the English word "debt"; conclusion (zero tier-one coverage) was still correct on reading, but the query was bad. Quote the ticker with the cashtag and add the handle.